an international and interdisciplinary journal of postmodern cultural sound, text and image
Volume 5, July-August 2008, ISSN 1552-5112
Meaninglessness in the Desert of the Real, or
the Form of Meaning and Unpretentious Objects
There seem to be many disparate ways of hoping to
both find and to figure out ‘Baudrillard’. It would be a fairly meaningless
statement, perhaps, to say that what one finds is much more than one hopes for,
and that this figure ‘Baudrillard’, lurks behind the pages and words. Veiled,
in a way, but never missing. I am hoping for fragments of understanding of
‘Baudrillard’, writing this small narrative about meaninglessness. The
conference session that this paper initially was written for was entitled
“Meaning within the Vacuum”. This imagery and figuration of a vacuum made me a
bit hesitant, and my mind still quietly wonders whether anything within a nothing is possible. This is a much
larger issue to narrate than what I will try to recount by putting focus on the
implications of the term ‘meaninglessness’ as used by Baudrillard. I do this by
circling around two central matters that I find deeply intertwined with the
notion of meaninglessness, namely the question concerning what constitutes art
and form, and how it is possible to indulge in (its) content.
In the following then, I will make some arguments
based on these matters and try to work around, and with the concept of
meaninglessness. This could quite ruthlessly be translated into very basic
questions concerning “What is the matter?”, “Who is the bystander/observer?”,
and “Who is the judge of all this meaning?” To me, these three questions seem pivotal
for any kind of confrontation with how objects in general are categorized and
classified, and how some of them become (re)constructed as objects of art. It
is a way of putting forward the understanding of how specific contexts and
situated practices legitimize that which becomes art, both as immaterial sign
value and as materialized matter.[1] And for the sake of appearances, I have quite
ruthlessly again reinserted these questions into the following subtitles, “The
Face of Indifference”, “The Meaning of Keeping Face”, and lastly a sort of
summary called “Facing Meaning, or Strategic Meaninglessness”. In the end,
these questions might touch upon the possibility for another meaning and meaningfulness,
beyond what seems to be the presumed vacuum of things.
I. The Face
of Indifference
Meaninglessness is an arbitrary word. It willingly
deprives something of worthy content, and in doing so makes a somewhat hazy recommendation
as to what is truly and rightfully meaningful. This is perhaps nothing new, as
it appears a word most tainted. A rather blunt insult to the person, act or
object that finds themselves appropriated and encapsulated by the term. But who
can make such an assertion with certainty? An image (image I) might be useful
in this respect, adding some uncertainty in relation to the labeling of
persons, acts and objects as distinctively meaningless or meaningful.
image
I.
Being as it may a rather poor digital image of a
reproduction print that I have in my home, the image depicts a nun gazing out
of a window. Perhaps it is the window of her cell, and what she is looking at
indeed escapes the eye of the spectator. What seems rather apparent is that it
looks as though she is in deep longing for something. She is in a sense,
elsewhere. I will come back to her, below, when touching upon how constructions
of form and content could be seen as deeply situated practices. In this then,
what is regarded as meaningless(ness) could turn out to be a rather ambiguous
play with words.[2]
Baudrillard uses the notion of meaninglessness in
order to try to turn its signification around. In Impossible Exchange Baudrillard states that: “If we could accept
this meaninglessness of the world, then we could play with forms, appearances
and our impulses, without worrying about their ultimate destination.”[3] This could
very well be the epitome quote, and it will work as one precondition for all
that follows in this narration. If meaninglessness becomes a state where an
implicitly more blissful order or disorder of things would be possible, what
would constitute its reconstituting other? That is, what has meaning to do with
all of this? How would it be possible to grapple with a meaninglessness
initiated and facilitated by forms and appearances? What kinds of forms would
be used, and seen as significant in signifying meaninglessness? Assigning and
appropriating this value for people, acts or objects in order to enable or to
make it easy for meaninglessness to take place, makes the question of ‘dead
ends’ value laden. What I am asking is: by what means, is a meaningless state
of being made possible? If the purpose of insisting on meaninglessness is to
make plausible another way of being and knowing in the world, this might lead
me to believe that the ontological and epistemological implications are of
central significance. Thus, as a precondition for the questions posed above
there is a need for engaging in a consideration of ‘meaninglessness’ and its
Other’. And as I interpret Baudrillard, meaninglessness would envelop our
present state of being—signified and described as “the desert of the real”.[4]
Belonging to this, our ‘desert’ is the immense
willingness and capacity to make subjects, acts and objects visible and
transparent in the intensive lights of information. When targeting and
(re)making this visibility, science becomes immensely helpful. Not the least
through the usage of its own construction: the scientific fact. In a way,
science becomes a legitimizing body of visibility.[5] According to Baudrillard this is partly due to the
help of a technological hand. Information and its increasing need for storage
are made possible through technological proliferation. In this respect,
technological solutions and information becomes each other’s wheel of fortune.
In the midst of this all, the notion of meaning resides. It lay as a sort of
generating factor, or as a prerequisite of the urge for deciphering matter, an
aid in the extraction of the real’s presumed content.[6] Meaning-making enlists faith in a reality out there
ready to be brought in and formulated. Yet, meaning has no ‘finality’ as
Baudrillard puts it, because there exists no actual outer absolute reference,
neither to confirm, nor condemn the (re)construction of meaning. The lack of
reference, the void of verifiable meaning, is what secretly lurks behind the
attempt to make sense of the world by forcing it to mean and matter through the
advocacy of meaning.[7]
However, this is also where the notion of
meaninglessness comes in, in its attempts to dismantle and counteract the
figuration that everything is more or less directly perceivable and
knowledgeable to us. According to Baudrillard, the gained excess of knowledge
and information also creates what it most of all despises, its polar opposite
which could be thought of as the grand ‘vacuum’. The outcome of this excess is
‘the disappearance of information in information’.[8] Still, if this is the case, that the urge for
information creates its destruction, why be interested in quickening the
process by advocacy of meaninglessness? Why not just let disappearance have its
own way?
The present ‘hyperreal’ state of being, where meaning
in all kinds of fabrics of life is created and endorsed by means of science and
knowledge, is of a double-edged character. As I interpret Baudrillard, the
‘hyperreal’ is the state most unwanted, yet it also harbors the (un)fortunate
quality of being the very prerequisite for the occurrence of an oppositional
space. This potentially different space could be seen as both, part and result,
of “radical thought”, “symbolic exchange” and the notion of meaninglessness. As
such, hyperreality enables the radical, something that could be seen as, and I
quote Baudrillard, “the final accomplishment of reality”.[9] The rather inevitable question of whether the
hyperreal can be thought of as a continuum, genuinely lacking potential for
anything ‘radical’, is to some extent lessened in strength. A possible way to
answer could be to say that when everything has spiraled out of control, the
time to indulge in acts of meaninglessness has come.
How can the understanding of the notion of
meaninglessness subsequently be transfigured so as to concern an indulgence in
much smaller matters of materiality? Is it possible to bring it to a level of
concreteness where it becomes a way of doing? But before going into these
matters, perhaps it is time for the nun. Does she portray the face of
indifference, in a state where meaning or meaningfulness in a sense is missing?
Or is it rather an account of unattended indifference, which very much belongs
to its spatial situation and context, and implies that an act of
meaninglessness in a way is already set in motion? This act presumably engaged
in by the nun might just be an (un)directed form of opposition, a “radical
singularity” in meaninglessness.[10] Such an argument might also hold some relevance to
the notion of the supposed general indifference of the ‘masses’, a notion
neither new nor strikingly controversial, yet apparently persistent in thought.
And I believe some of its persistence in thought lies in relation to the
question of art and its intention and allocation. What I am referring to here
is to what extent the narrative of art always seems to entail a more or less
implicit fear of what might happen to art and aesthetics if it was ‘properly
understood’ by many more than many less. For instance, indifference seems to be
an implicit part of Theodor Adorno’s configuration of “the masses”, in their
presumed relation to aesthetics in general. Walter Benjamin raises this
question somewhat differently, although to me the question of the dawning
(mass) proliferation of images touches upon the image as becoming “the mass”.[11] Instead of disbelieving indifference, counteracting
it signification, Baudrillard writes that “indifference is an atonal form of
challenge”.[12]
Perhaps all is well in a world of meaninglessness.
But why is it that a presumed concretization of the notion of meaninglessness
seems to be without all the messy contexts of its making? Does it not also have
forces around itself, which try to narrate and forge it into something that it
is, or perhaps should not be or become? Two attempts to contextualize what
meaninglessness could constitute in relation to form will be the focus of the
following section. We will examine the form of one object more conventionally
perceived as art, and another, I believe, can be regarded as a ‘non-art’
object.
II. The
Meaning of Keeping Face
If we go back to the initial quote by Baudrillard,
what constitutes form seems pivotal both for the initiation and the
facilitation of meaninglessness. Baudrillard states in numerous writings that
art and language could act as examples of these forms. Art and language have
the potential to collude in illusion, these forms being “the illusion of the
world and the possibility to invent this other scene”.[13] Specifically, on language, Baudrillard writes:
“…language, while belonging to the domain of illusion, allows us to play with
that illusion”.[14] Even with such possibility at hand, art is a form
which has become increasingly pretentious for Baudrillard, and he writes of
this in Conspiracy of Art.
Contemporary art attempts to encapsulate and devour all of reality, as it
aspires to be reality. This type of argument, positng the loss of art as such,
however, seems to me to be somewhat loosely problematized. It fails to present
the difference between what art did or was supposed to do in the past, and how
this is different to what works of art try to do today.[15] The way I understand Baudrillard’s take on this is
rather through a perspective of function, i.e. the way contemporary art in a
way is indebted to function. Having functionality implies a functioning towards
something else, something real in a reality. Functionality in this sense goes
hand in hand with the idea of representation as a mirroring of the world. One
way of having function is by presuming to say ‘radical’ things about the
present time. Although what startles me is that having such a function of
radicality, with respect to the contemporary period and use of art, might not
be that different from what some art did one, two or three hundred years ago.
This is, to my knowledge, something that is not discussed at length. However, I
believe that what Baudrillard intends to argue is that truly subversive art
does not engage in proclaiming the world as it is, rather it invents another
one, an “other scene”. And as such, being of this ‘otherness’, it might not be
immediately distinguishable and readable to us. Perhaps it is only barely
perceptible to us, and because of that reason we could be inclined to disregard
it as meaningless.
In this scenario of contemporary art, images, still
being a vast part of ‘the art world’, increasingly have lost their potential
for any form of radicality. It might seem paradoxical considering the
potentially ‘given’ radicality enabled by the proliferation of images through
the use of a number of ‘new’ mediums. Instead, the escalating number of
circulating images seems to tell less and less.[16] Even so, image (II) might serve as a reminder of the
rather apparent urge for imagery, and of the feeling we have, perhaps, of ‘not
getting enough’ of images. The photograph is taken at the very crowded entrance
hall of the Louvre in
image
II.
First at hand lay an object which I earlier, and
quite ruthlessly, assigned to the sphere of art. It is its relation or
potential to radicality and meaninglessness, in its context of digital visual
production that will be my focus here. Keeping in mind Baudrillard’s words on
media as “technical objects” that impose “new modes of relation and
perception,” the question of the possibility to exert radical modes of
relations in respect to the digitally-made visual object seems important.[17] If we have not already completely deserted these
types of digitally-produced images, then they too should hold a potential for
radical thought and for the invention of an “other scene.”
As for my thought, an object of art may be
exemplified by the work of Finnish artist Ilkka Halso. The image (III)
displayed is a piece taken from Halso’s pamphlet
image III.
But does Halso’s piece go under the epithet
‘meaningless’ and/or constitute an “other scene”? Who gets to assert its
radical potential? Consequently, the question that I find troubling is that of
who qualifies as a knowing subject in all of this. I don’t think there is any
need for an affirmatively positive approach like “iconoclashing”, put on
display by Bruno Latour.[19] Neither distinguishing between mediums, nor the
frequency of forms, makes art easier to understand. Rather, this type of
argument of ‘images clashing’ seem to be a quite postmodern way of distorting
or disregarding the context and the “situated knowledge” in which an object of
art is being created.[20] An approach like this also seems to put a
relativistic veil over the presumed observing and knowing subject. Although
leaving it all up to the search for the presumed contextual space of the
creator, might initiate a talent or weakness for finding the true objective
visual reference or original. [21] On the other hand, referring the potential for
radicality in a work of art, primarily to the statements made by its creator,
could seem overly easy and predictable. It also tends to leave the observer
completely blank, since whatever the observer’s gaze may find in it will be
taken as a subordinated act of looking. [22]
And in terms of unthreading the mystery of an image
and its potential for meaninglessness, who is able to assert what constitutes a
“breakdown” and a “breakthrough” is not merely a question of who or how many.
It is also a question of how. As I understand Baudrillard’s terminology, what
might be problematic is if a “breakdown” or “breakthrough” aspires to
deconstruct meaning.[23] What if these matters were futile, in terms of being
(pre)code-incorporated? Another action might be to partake or remain in the
position where one simply “decodes the message”. Decoding seems awfully much
like a one-coded story. Since its foundation rests on the premise of the world
as it is (as one), representation then merely acts as an in- and output
apparatus.[24] Is it possible instead to talk of a contextualized
understanding, and of a type of desert- deciphering when trying to make
objects, acts or people a bit more meaningless? The act of deciphering should
not then imply or result in a one-way decoding, where the question of the
preferential right of interpretation is not also taken into consideration.
One way of revising the ‘who’ and ‘how’ might be to
stray, for a moment, from ‘the pretentiousness of art,’ when signifying some
acts as breakdown and breakthrough.[25] Maybe we do not always need specifically
(pre)categorized and (pre)constructed objects, such as ‘objects of art,’ to
enable for or create an “other scene” of illusion and play of the mind? I
wonder if it might not be possible to also, or instead, turn to somewhat more
unpretentious objects. This next image (IV) might work in this respect, as it
exemplifies an object that I believe is very much so perceived as being a
non-art object.
image IV.
It is my Parisian globe which rests on my desk at
home, sometimes reminding me of Baudrillard and his work on simulacra and
simulation. I gaze at ‘the
III. Facing
Meaning, or ‘Strategic Meaninglessness’
It is time I believe to sum up and possibly face
meaning. It could certainly strike one as constituting a meaningful activity,
this arguing for meaninglessness. Consequently and somewhat paradoxically, the
prolongation of this could mean and lead to possible acts of ‘strategic
meaninglessness’. By advocating or striving for meaninglessness through and by
forms such as language or art, meaninglessness all of a sudden becomes another
meaning, something in a sense more meaningful than meaning.
A sort of institutionalization of meaninglessness
might not at all be the preferred way to go. If meaninglessness holds a sort of
quiet ontological remedy, a way of counteracting the hyperreal expansion and
expenditure, making it into a strategy I believe fails to grasp its
oppositional character. Disregarding the possible mode of procedure for the
notion of meaninglessness, the question of its maintenance still remains. With
this I mean, what if the hyperreal allows for certain outbursts, could it not
be that the singularities of radical thought or meaninglessness are included,
in an all-inclusive system? Although, asking about the possibility of living in
a perpetual, happier state of meaninglessness might be getting too close to the
hazardous fields of theorizing a possible utopia. Even so, attempting ephemeral
meaninglessness, can we endure its temporality? Not closer to an answer, I end
this narrative with a final quote by Baudrillard: “I have no illusion, no belief,
except in forms – reversibility, seduction or metamorphosis.”[27]
an international and interdisciplinary journal of postmodern cultural sound, text and image
Volume 5, July-August 2008, ISSN 1552-5112
IV. Reference Matter
Adorno, Theodor W. (2002, (1981)), The Culture
Industry, Routledge:
Asplund, Johan (2006), Munnens
socialiet och andra essäer, Bokförlaget Korpen: Göteborg.
Benjamin, Walter (?),
”Konstverket i den tekniska reproduktionsåldern”, in Burrill, John (1987),
Kritisk teori: en introduktion, Daidalos: Göteborg.
Barad, Karen (2003), “Posthumanist Performativity:
Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter” in Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society 28:2003:3.
Baudrillard, Jean (2005), Conspiracy of Art,
translated by Ames Hodges, Semiotext(e):
– (2001) Impossible Exchange, translated by Chris
Turner, Verso:
– (1998, (1997)), Paroxysm. Interviews with Philippe
Petit, translated by Chris Turner, Verso:
– (1994, (1981)), Simulacra and Simulation,
translated by Sheila Faria Glaser, The University of Michigan Press:
Chadwick, Whitney (2002, 3 ed.), Women, Art and
Society, Thames & Hudson:
Coulter,
de Lauretis, Teresa (1987),
Technologies of Gender. Essays on
Theory, Film and Fiction, Macmillan Press: Houndmills,
Genosko, Gary (1999), McLuhan and Baudrillard, The
masters of implosion, Routledge:
Hall, Stuart, Hobson, Dorothy, Lowe, Andrew &
Willis, Paul (eds.) (1980), Culture, Media, Language, Routledge:
Haraway, Donna (2001, (1996)), ”Det
beskjedne vitnet: Feministiske diffraksjoner i vitenskapsstudier” in Asdal,
Kristin, Brenna, Brita & Moser, Ingunn (eds.) (2001), Teknovitenskapelige
Kulturer, Spartacus Förlag:
– (1997),
Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™, Routledge: New
York & London.
– (1991), Simians, Cyborgs and Women, The Reinvention
of Nature, Routledge:
Latour, Bruno (2002), “What Is Iconoclash? Or Is
There a World Beyond the Image Wars?”, URL: www.bruno-latour.fr/articles/article/084.html.
Fetched 2008-01-10.
Pawlett, William (2007), Jean Baudrillard, Against
Banality, Routledge:
Rajan, Tilottama (2002), Deconstruction and the
Remainders of Phenomenology,
Virilio, Paul (2003, (2000)), Art and Fear,
Continuum:
– (1996, (1989)), Försvinnandets
estetik, Bokförlaget Korpen: Uddevalla.
Notes