an international and interdisciplinary journal of postmodern cultural sound, text and image
Volume 8, June-July-August 2011,
ISSN 1552-5112
Whose Empire?
Which Multitude?
Introduction
In Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue for a
re-ordering of the current global capitalist paradigm (Empire).[1] Their
approach is Marxian: they provide an analysis of labour (‘immaterial labour’),
ascribe a revolutionary situation (global state of war) and point to a
revolutionary subject created by the labour conditions (the ‘multitude’). This
overall picture is very well known: capitalism in its drive for production
produces its own gravediggers. The novelty factor in Hardt and Negri’s theory
is the concept of ‘immaterial labour’ as opposed to industrial labour and the
revolutionary subject of the ‘multitude’ instead of the working class. I argue
that both of these central concepts are flawed: ‘immaterial labour’ is a
misnomer and the ‘multitude’ is not a viable political player.
Immaterial Labour
For Hardt
and Negri post-industrial labour is particularly characterised by, what they
call, ‘immaterial labour’ which now plays the new ‘hegemonic role’ (M, p.107f.), as opposed to the
industrial labour during Marx’s time. ‘Immaterial labour’ is described as
1)
‘informationalised industrial production processes’,
2) the
engagement with ‘analytical and symbolic tasks’,
3) the
‘production and manipulation of affects which requires virtual or actual human
contact and proximity’.
Hardt and
Negri have already been, rightly, criticised for type 1 (e.g. Sayers, S.,
2007): the fact that the production of material goods today often involves
modern computer and communication technologies does not change the fact that
what is produced is nevertheless a material thing. Thus, production, although
informationalised, remains nevertheless material.
The clearest
and most succinct formulation is the following:
Since the production of services results in no material and durable
good, we might define the labor involved in this production as immaterial
labour-that is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a service,
knowledge, or communication. (Hardt, 1999, p.94)
The
examples given are:
Health care
Education
Finance
Entertainment Hardt
(1999), Hardt and Negri (E, p.285)
Advertising
Fast food
services
Transportation
Audiovisual production
Fashion
Software
production Lazzarato
(Immaterial Labour, available
Photography
at
www.generation-online.org)
Photography
Cultural
activities
For Hardt
and Negri these examples share the traits of ‘immaterial labour’. But what
could they have in common? What is the connection between photography and
transportation, or fast food services and health care? To my mind, these
activities hardly fit under any
single descriptive term pertaining to their nature. As can be seen from the
quote, everything ‘immaterial’ (like entertainment, advertising, audiovisual
production) is considered a service and only actual material objects are
products. I argue that this conception of ‘immaterial labour’ negates the
distinction between products and services.[2] This is
inadequate and leads to several misconceptions.
Goods
and services
The
decisive feature for the status of a product or a good is that it can be owned,
not whether it is physical: materiality/immateriality
is unimportant. Important is rather that ownership rights can be established
and exchanged (which means that goods are tradable) and that they are distinct
entities independently of their producers and owners: the production takes
place separately in space and time, the finished product can be distributed,
traded, and consumed long after production. These
features can apply to both material as
well as immaterial products: literature, music, theories, plans, designs,
films, programs, etc. may be ‘immaterial products’ but they are nevertheless
goods (like material products) because they are produced, are separate entities
from their makers, they can be owned, traded, copied, used, etc. independently
of their production which thus remains a separate process. Thus, contrary to
the concept of ‘immaterial labour’,
an immaterial good is nevertheless a good and not a service.
Services,
by contrast, differ from both material and
immaterial goods. They are relations (e.g. agreements) and therefore are not separate production processes
resulting in separate entities independently of the people involved; thus, they
cannot be owned and hence not traded, distributed, or copied. Services can only
be rendered. Nor is it possible to distinguish a production-process from the
‘use’ or ‘consumption’ of a service, as you can in the case of goods. Thus, products
are made, whereas services are rendered.[3] Films,
ideas, etc. may be immaterial but are nevertheless made products, not rendered
services. Of course, products and services may coincide, namely in the case of
the service including a made product (for example a tailored suit). But also in
such cases the made product does not somehow become immaterial, instead it is
still possible to distinguish between the service and the product. The product
is what remains, whether the service was concluded or not. If the customer
retreats from the deal, the tailor still has a suit. He owns it and does with
it as he pleases. If the customer buys the suit, the ownership goes to him and
he can do with it as he pleases. However, not all services include a product. A
cleaner, for example, provides a service but does not produce a good over which
he holds ownership rights. Hardt and Negri confuse products and services because
they wrongly declare the physicality of something to decide over its status as
a good or a service. But goods are not just physical objects (they also include
non-physical ones like plans, theories, stories, films etc.), nor are all
non-physical objects automatically services. In short, contrary to what Hardt
and Negri suggest, the difference between material objects and non-material
things is not the same as that
between labour and service. Therefore, it is wrong to claim that “the division
between manufacturing and services is becoming blurred” (Hardt, 1999, p.92).
Goods and services remain distinct.
This has
implications for the use of ‘immaterial labour’ in Hardt and Negri’s theory of
revolution because of the social and political implications they draw from it.
They claim that
…in each of these forms of immaterial labor, cooperation is completely
inherent in the labour itself. Immaterial labour immediately involves social
interaction and cooperation. (E,
p.294)[4]
This
socialising function is crucial since Hardt and Negri conclude that “immaterial
labour thus seems to provide the potential for a kind of spontaneous and
elementary communism.” (ibid.)
However,
is it true that what Hardt and Negri call ‘immaterial labour’ involves the
social dimension that services do? I claim that immaterial products are not
necessarily collective, nor ‘immediately involve social interaction and
cooperation’: an immaterial good can be produced and consumed alone – it is not
automatically a service. For example, one may come up with a plan, a story, or
a theory, by oneself and may also “consume” it by oneself. There is no service,
nor a social relation (sufficient for spontaneous and elementary communism)
involved.
Furthermore,
there can even be services, which are not collective in any strong sense
either. Consider most maintenance services: apart from an initial agreement on
what is to be done, not much more contact is necessary. I do not have to be
present when my car is being serviced, my house cleaned, or my TV fixed. The
same holds for other examples of ‘immaterial labour’ that are advanced:
advertising, fast food services, transportation, audiovisual production, etc. I
thus contend that immaterial labour mostly does not imply the kind of social
dimension that is asserted of it, at least not one that is sufficient for the
kind of sociality that Hardt and Negri have in mind – the multitude. But first
I would like to say a bit more about ‘immaterial labour’.
The novelty of
‘immaterial labour’
It is
claimed that ‘informatisation’ and ‘immaterial labour’ feature a social
dimension unlike previous kinds of
labour. Modern telecommunication and technology, particularly computers and the
internet, are introduced as radically new media allowing for new ways of interaction.
Pfeiffer (2004, p.22ff.), by contrast, argues that Hardt and Negri rig their
analysis: they reduce earlier working conditions to a “non-interactive,
non-communicative, and machine-like counter-image” (translation U.M.) after
which other conditions must then appear as new. The computer as the “universal
tool” is regarded as introducing cooperation, communication, and
interaction, as if these features did not exist beforehand.
It is also
asserted that labour (due to the use of computers) homogenises in ‘abstract
labour’ which supposedly distances the worker from his object.[5] But with
some more differentiation these claims can be questioned. The supposed
homogenization of labour is by no means a new idea, particularly within the
Marxist tradition.[6] Whether
it was successful in Marx’s time or not,
I agree with Pfeiffer (op.cit.) that the computer is used in such
differing ways that it is simply false to claim that it homogenises all of its
applications into abstract, universal, symbolic, or interactive work. Whether
you work in software design, consumer service, manufacturing control and/or
supervision, graphic design, or simply text creation makes a vast difference as
to how the computer (and which software) is being used. Thus the skills,
knowledge, and experience involved vary drastically.
I also
dispute that the use of computers necessarily distances the worker from his
object, i.e. that it makes labour more abstract. Equally, the opposite can be
shown: various simulation techniques, for example, can lead to the
understanding and control of processes that were previously inaccessible to the
worker (such as in the chemical industry, the manipulation of digital images,
or music recording). Thus, Hardt and Negri’s claim that labour necessarily
becomes more homogeneous, abstract or distancing requires more proof.
From these
points I conclude that ‘immaterial labour’, as characterised by Hardt, Negri,
and Lazzarato, is a misnomer. The various examples they give hardly have
unifying features and the reason is a confusion of immaterial products with
services. The computer is contentiously conceived as a ‘universal tool’ leading
to homogenisation as well as alienation. Yet neither the production and
transfer of information, nor of affects (Hardt, 1999), nor the involvement of
symbolic tasks applies equally; nor do these criteria share in any noteworthy
increase in ‘abstraction’ or communication.
Marx’s
inheritance – the unsolved labour-puzzle
Another
problem of ‘immaterial labour’, which is a direct outcome of the application of
Marx’s thought, is its evaluation. Already among the primary writers we find
two opposing sides: Hardt and Negri see ‘immaterial labour’ positively,
Lazzarato purely negatively.
For Hardt
and Negri ‘immaterial labour’ is crucial because it enables the formation of
the ‘multitude’ and its resistance to global capitalism (M, p.66f). On the other hand, ‘immaterial labour’ is also a new
stage in the exploitation of the worker, who is meant to be flexible, social,
perform her tasks with a smile, communicate, etc. In other words, not only the
worker’s body is subordinated and
directed but also her character, her identity and subjectivity (M, pp.65f.,111,113). For Lazzarato
‘immaterial labour’ therefore intrinsically embodies all the hallmarks of
capitalist exploitation. There is no sense here of immaterial labour as an
enabling condition for a future communism.
Instead of enabling the ‘multitude’, it establishes capital relationships,
its discourse is authoritarian, it takes hold of the workers’ subjectivity and
it is Taylorist. Whereas Hardt and Negri claim that “in immaterial production
the creation of cooperation has
become internal to labour and thus external
to capital” (M, p.147, my emphasis)
Lazzarato claims the direct opposite, immaterial
labour is the manifestation of “the capital relationship”.
This
ambiguity concerning the evaluation of labour is not a new one, particularly
not within the general framework of Historical Materialism. Already in Marx’s
writings this is an issue. Within his philosophical anthropology of the human
species, labour plays the key role because no other living being produces the
means for its own life and no other produces so universally. It is the activity
of labour that singles humans out from other animal species and it is the
condition of scarcity, within which man finds himself, that triggers, for Marx,
man’s ingenuity (e.g.: German Ideology,
p.31, 32, 36, 37; 1859 Preface; Capital I, p.84, 86). In order to
overcome the scarcity of the means of life and the unfavourable natural
conditions that humans experience with hunger, cold, rain and lack of comfort,
humans start to change their environment in their favour. They gather, hunt and
prepare food, they build shelter, they make clothing, and they construct tools.
In all of this humans learn as much about themselves as they do about the
things they work on. It is an important part of the Hegelian strand within Marx
that labour and self-realisation are inextricably linked. We externalise
ourselves in our labour and in doing so we learn something about our nature,
our abilities and our possibilities. This is the positive side of Marx’s
evaluation of labour. As with Hardt and Negri above, here labour enables
certain abilities that we would not have without it. Even stronger, the human
species would not be what it is without labour: engaging in it is part of our
being. It should therefore be cultivated and brought under the control of all
and “consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan” (Capital I, p.84).
Yet there
is also an opposing side within Marx’s writings: labour, exactly because it is
a necessary part of our nature, belongs to the realm of necessity as
distinguished from the realm of freedom. We cannot choose but to labour or all
the achievements that we have reached through it will cease to exist sooner or
later. Crops have to be sown and reaped; food has to be prepared; most
materials have to be extracted from the earth; homes have to be built. Unless
this labour is accomplished we will soon experience drastic food shortages and
dilapidating living conditions. Labour is thus necessary and not free. This is
why Marx distinguishes the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom in the
late Capital III (p. 820) and why he
claims that the shortening of the working hours is the precondition for the
realm of freedom: “Beyond it [the realm of necessity] begins that development
of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom […].” In
other words: do the work that needs to be done and afterwards you can be free.
At one point Marx even calls for the abolition of labour because its mere
liberation is not enough (German Ideology,
p.223, 224).
Both of
these sides of the evaluation of labour can be found in Marx’s writings and many
of his scholars have tried to find an explanation for it. There are those who
argue for the compatibility of the two sides (e.g. Chitty 1993; Sayers 2003)
and there are those who argue the opposite (e.g. Marcuse 1955, 1965; Schaff
1965; Press 1977; McLellan 1984), often attributing the positive evaluation to
the early Marx and the negative view to the late Marx. However, I leave this
debate to scholarship. The main point here is that the issue concerning the
evaluation of labour can already be found in Marx and, as shown above, the same
applies to ‘immaterial labour’, depending on whether one reads Hardt and Negri
or Lazzarato. It remains unclear whether ‘immaterial labour’ is what labour
ought to be (namely communicative and ‘immediately social’) or whether it
presents a new stage of capitalist exploitation and alienation.
The Multitude
The
‘multitude’ is the corresponding idea to Marx’s industrial proletariat (M, p.103f.). But in contrast to the
proletariat, the ‘multitude’ is a wider concept that is more apt to today’s
conditions.[7] “The
multitude gives the concept of the proletariat its fullest definition as all
those who labour and produce under the rule of capital.” (M, p.107). As explained above, Hardt and Negri take the modern
labour conditions of ‘immaterial labour’ to be such that they involve a maximum
of connectivity and interrelations between labourers (ibid, p.107).
The
increasingly dense network of trade and trade-relations in the global capitalist
economy together with modern communication technology and labour practices put
all of the subjects into closer contact with each other. ‘Immaterial labour’,
Hard and Negri assert, features an intrinsic sociality and thus the enables the
concerted action of ‘all those subject to capitalist production’ (M, p.106). The characteristics of the
‘multitude’ are the following:
a)
it consists of all those subject to Empire
b)
it is irreducibly different (i.e.
many-faceted, multitudinous), it includes for example: workers, political
activists, animal rights campaigners, homosexuals, rebellious groups like the
Zapatistas, open source advocates, etc.
c)
it expresses the desire for a world of
equality and freedom
d)
it demands an open and inclusive democratic
global society
e)
it provides the means for achieving c) and
d) (M, p.xi)
Hardt and
Negri deliberately make no distinction between political, social, and economic
organisations or groups since it is part of the postmodern condition that the
boundaries between these concepts are increasingly blurred. It all becomes
‘biopolitical’, i.e. it ‘engages life in its entirety’ (M, p.94). The ‘multitude’ is therefore the group of all groups, the
one of which they are all parts but which does not reduce them in a way that
undermines their differences (like other group concepts such as ‘people’, or
‘mass’).[8] According
to such a definition the ‘multitude’ is, so to say, a social universal set.[9]
My claim
is that a universal set cannot be a
political agent.[10]
What binds
this ‘multiplicity’ are the shared grievances against Empire, and Hardt and Negri help themselves to
an analogy of social organisation which is meant to explain how the
‘multitude’, despite its innumerable internal differences, can act: the network
analogy. But I question this analogy.
Networks
The
communicative relations between people, which Empire itself brings about in modern production (‘immaterial
labour’) requires relations, connections, and involves the worker’s
subjectivity: it thereby establishes a network of communication.[11] For Hardt
and Negri, this network, like Empire, has no centre but consists of numerous
autonomous cells linked only by communication.[12] Because
these networks deliberately have neither a centre nor an authoritative
hierarchy they are therefore intrinsically democratic. This is the main reason
why the postmodern world is, for the first time, in the position to bring about
a global radical democracy. Only
through ‘immaterial labour’ can a global democratic counter-Empire be realised
by the ‘multitude’.
However,
Hardt and Negri’s appeal to network structures is oversimplified: they assume
that networks are equally balanced throughout, without a hierarchy,
preferential statuses or functions.[13] This does
not apply to all networks, crucially it does not apply to social networks;
instead, recent research has revealed that such systems are not horizontally structured, as
supposed. Social networks, contrary to the horizontal approach, are
characterised by preferred connections, functional differentiation,
key-positions and an unequal power distribution between people and groups of
people.[14] I claim
that such features are necessary for any kind of social organisation.
Contrary
to what Hardt and Negri suggest, social networks: a) are structured, b) do not
grow in an egalitarian manner but according preferential connections, i.e.
according to the status of adjacent people or positions, c) as a consequence,
if key-positions are damaged then the overall structure quickly disintegrates,
contrary to Hardt and Negri’s claim that resistance simply reforms even if the
network is attacked by Empire. Without these features a network is simply not
organised at all.[15]
Structures, for whichever specific purpose, enable advancement through the
order they establish. This order then allows progress in terms of social
complexity, knowledge and information, economic interchanges, approved or
disapproved actions (i.e. law), etc.[16] Any
feasible social theory today has to include organisations, institutions and
structures, because it is the structural and functional differentiation of our
societies which enable our current life in the first place.
To
advocate the self-rule of the global working population (i.e. the ‘multitude’)
is not progressive, but rather simply unrealistic. Note that I am not arguing that the network idea as such is useless. Within limited
confines horizontal network structures can have their use, for example in
deliberation, awareness-raising or public debates (see Dryzeck, 2005, p.230;
Kellner, 2002, p.295ff.).
But for
decision-making (law and policy for example) functionality requires
organisation, that is, having particular offices/positions/roles/institutions
with distinctive functions, such as we have, say, in the distinction between
the legislative, judiciary and executive functions of the government.
Political
viability
‘Radically
democratic’ networks such as the ‘multitude’
are, by definition, non-representable, which means that they cannot answer
questions of legitimacy: How are we to determine who makes legitimate decisions regarding any particular issue and which
decisions can be regarded as representative
of the people concerned?
Although
Hardt and Negri focus on how the public and its governance are to be construed
for our post-national and global age, they are not giving a clear answer. Their
model of self-governance in a global sphere is equal to having no governance because to govern oneself
in a world without borders leaves one fighting for oneself instead of fighting together
with others.[17] In a
world without boundaries I cannot tell who is legitimately party to my concern - who is ‘sitting in the same
boat’ - who has a rightful claim to be included in the decision-making process
- and who does not. Without boundaries of inclusion/exclusion, that define who
is a rightful party to a decision and conditions concerning the legitimacy of
political decisions we simply have no framework for any governance whatsoever
(see Fraser, 2007, p.224-253).
Hardt and
Negri suppose, like Marx, a global solidarity of the workers merely on the
grounds of the supposed homogeneity of their labour. But if I am correct in
claiming that the supposed homogeneity is mistaken, then this severely weakens
a concept of solidarity that is based on it. Furthermore, it is by no means
clear that the ‘multitude’ will be as
collaborative as Hardt and Negri tell us (cf. Schmalz-Bruhns, 2007, p.271). If
the unity of the ‘multitude’ results from its opposition to Empire, then what
keeps it connected once Empire has ceased to exist?
If, as
Hardt and Negri stress, the ‘multitude’ is, like Marx’s proletariat, a
class-concept, then the same difficulty applies: ‘class’ is defined by
opposition to another class (here it is Empire,
rather than a social class). But once the opposing concept is gone what will
happen to the supposed victors? For Marx this problem was solvable: insofar as
he conceived of the proletariat as the class of the industrial labourers, the
post-revolutionary situation is one in which the proletariat stops being a
class and becomes a global labour force united by the centrality of industrial labour. But Hardt and Negri cannot
adopt this strategy so easily because they explicitly insist that the
‘multitude’ is irreducible to a particular
central activity. The ‘multitude’ is by definition a class of irreducible
differences. So the question rises, what will unite those irreducible
differences once Empire, as the common enemy, has ceased to exist? What or who ensures collaboration and prevents
faction-building? Without some kind
of institution this will be impossible because the public misses an important
element: namely a bearer of responsibility for whom it is a public in the first place.[18] Such a
bearer of responsibility would have to draw boundaries for whom, and which
issues, it is responsible and for whom and which it is not.
Self-determination
is what Hardt and Negri have in mind when they argue that the ‘multitude’ can
rule itself. But also ‘the concept of collective self-determination requires
the distinction between members and non-members’ (Habermas, 1998, p.161, as
quoted in Schmalz-Bruhns, ibid., p.271, translation U.M.). That is, we have to
define a particular public to which
self-determination applies. For the vast majority of decisions this public cannot be global because most decisions
are made locally, or regionally, perhaps nationally, and concern particular
people or groups of people.[19] Thus,
decisions are particular and have limits concerning scope and applicability,
i.e. a framework has to be established for whom a particular decision is
relevant and for whom it is not. Only very few decisions apply globally. In
other words, for decision-making we need the relevant publics which thus need
to have boundary-conditions. The ‘multitude’, by Hardt and Negri’s own
definition, has no
boundary-conditions.
For these
reasons I argue that the ‘multitude’ does not constitute a political player.
The network-analogy does not simply apply and there is no structure to maintain
any status quo after Empire has been
fought. In being non-representative and global the ‘multitude’ cannot make any
decisions because important referents and conditions for decision-making,
legitimacy and responsibility are missing. These are, however, essential parts
for any democratic theory. Without them we are left with a patchwork which
explicitly does not feature any
preferential statuses, hierarchy, or authority, without which a network is
simply not organised at all and thus incapable of legitimate decision-making. Yet, particularly on
the global scale, which Hardt and Negri target, decisions need to be made and
adhered to, for otherwise we cannot speak of a global subject at all.[20]
There has
to be some structure and identifiable
goals and members, otherwise we may have a social movement but not a political
agent. This last point I would give to Hardt and Negri: the multitude may be a
movement, particularly a protest movement, but it is not a political agent. The
switch from the former to the latter would, according to my argument, require a
move away from the network-analogy, or an acknowledgement that even networks
are not as egalitarian as often claimed. A patchwork of autonomous cells that
continuously form, re-form, and disband, as Hardt and Negri imagine it, is not
a political group. The latter
requires organisation and cannot be “[…] essentially elusive, ephemeral,
perpetually in flight” (M, p.55).
That is, it must itself be an organisation in order to act like one.
an international and interdisciplinary journal of postmodern cultural sound, text and image
Volume 8, June-July-August 2011,
ISSN 1552-5112
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Notes