an international and interdisciplinary journal of postmodern cultural sound, text and image
Volume 6, May-June 2009, ISSN
1552-5112
Rethinking Critical Theory…
The philosophical reflections developed by the first
and the second generation of the Frankfurt School (through the work of
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas) constitute, in my opinion, a
contribution of vital importance to the construction of a critical theory
capable of responding to the current challenges of society and politics.
However, in order to reconstruct a critical theory for the present times, it is
necessary to start from the problems that the
In my view
the separation between a theory of domination and a normative theory of
democracy reveals a theoretical problem. Hence, a reconstructed critical theory
should aim at the reconciliation of these two dimensions (theory of power and
theory of democracy), both fundamental for a critical understanding of the
present. However, a concrete development of this theoretical proposal requires
broader conceptual tools than those of the critical theory of the
In my opinion, the normative question cannot be
neglected from a Marxist point of view; my claim (a claim which I share with
many so-called “analytical Marxists”) is that the Marxist critique to
capitalism presupposes some non-declared normative assumptions. These are
grounded on the idea that a just society is the one that guarantees positive
freedom, understood as conscious control over one’s own life and a free
development of all individuals. The normative question, which is present in
Marx as a non-explicit assumption (see the whole debate on “Marxism and
morality”) needs to be systematically clarified.
If we assume this point, we understand very clearly the
importance of the definition of a normative perspective as outlined by Jürgen
Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel. The ultimate rationale for the proposal advanced
in different ways by these philosophers can be expressed as follows: whoever discusses
the principles of a good political order is already accepting rational
argumentation and its rules. However, argumentation requires the ability of
equally considering the reasons of everyone. If everyone has an equal right to
have his/her own reasons considered,
it follows (this point has been made particularly clear by Apel) that everyone
has an equal right to have his/her claims met and his/her needs and interests
satisfied. This implies a normative principle according to which only those norms are valid
that meet (or could meet) with the approval of the participants in an ideal discursive procedure.
Having defined this starting
point, which is a very abstract and very general point (we could say that this is
the meta-principle of discursive research of valid norms or principles), we can
now approach more directly the question concerning the just principles of the
social and political order. From this point of view, it is important to develop
a confrontation with the theoretical tradition that, in modern times, has most
thoroughly engaged with the issue of the normative principles of a social and
political community: the contractualist current of thought. Critical theory
therefore needs in my view to
confront the paradigm of the social contract, as developed in the classics of
modernity such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant and represented by Rawls in
the last part of the 20th century. However, if we want
contractualism to play a meaningful role as a normative paradigm of politics,
it should be more precisely defined: its theoretical advantage certainly does
not rely on the account it gave of
the genesis of the state (from this perspective contractualism is one of the
weakest theories) but on the definition it provided of the question of
legitimacy: a legitimate social and political order is the one that free and
equal individuals would choose for themselves if they had to establish, at an
ideal starting point, the fundamental rules of their coexistence.
In my opinion the systematic
question of contractualism is not so different from the one Habermas poses in Between Facts and Norms; Habermas asks:
which rights would citizens reciprocally attribute to each other?[1]. Rawls asks:
how should rights and duties be distributed, and how should the costs and
benefits of social cooperation be divided[2]? So, reading the contractualist paradigm from the
perspective of discourse theory, we can ask the following question: which
principles of a legitimate political order for a modern society would be chosen
by citizens in a rational and egalitarian discourse aimed at reaching an
agreement?
The question of the principles
of social cooperation has generated in contemporary political theory a
plurality of responses, all normatively articulated. The most significant ones
are, in my opinion:
a) the Habermasian theory of democracy based on a
system of rights that consists in civil, political, and social rights.
b) the Rawlsian theory of egalitarian liberalism based
on the two principles of liberty and balanced equality.
c) neo-Aristotelian, neo-Hegelian and neo-republican
theories, which theorize the different dimensions of human development,
reciprocal recognition, and the central role of interactive spheres as a
primary condition for individual development.
d) libertarian theories based on the priority of
individual freedom, basically understood as market-freedom.
Yet none of these theories seems to me to be satisfactory.
I believe it is possible to suggest a different, clearer and less unilateral
solution to the problem of social
contract principles, or normative principles of a just society in the
conditions of modernity. I will try to summarize them at a high level of
abstraction by also referring to the different theoretical traditions that have
contributed in their elaboration.
The first point is that we need
to prevent arbitrariness and violence through the creation of a legal system.
There is an immediate need for security and self-preservation, that in a large
and complex society, only the law can guarantee. But what is a legal order?
Clearly there are many possible legal regulations, but in order to count as
“right” such forms should posses some intrinsic characteristics. In fact, the
assumption of positivist theories according to which law may have whatsoever
content (Kelsen) is false; on the contrary, in order to count as such, law
should implement some basic moral principles (for example: the prohibition of
violence) and cohere with some fundamental formal principles (for example: nullum crimen sine lege). This is the
fundamental requirement advanced by liberalism in a very precise and
restricted perspective, that of the rule of law and of the legal guarantees in
favour of individual protection (Bobbio).
A second point is related to
the fundamental claim suggested already by Hobbes and clearly developed already
in Spinoza and Rousseau: if society is to be defined as a free association of
individuals, it can only be ruled according to a democratic method. From
the question of law we are necessarily led to the question of democracy, since
law (although not entirely disposed of) must be determined and specified, and
no other subject is more suitably entitled to provide that than the democratic
legislator.
The third fundamental principle
(derived from the socialist thought) is the one that regulates
participation in the costs and benefits of social cooperation. I think it might
be defined (going back to a suggestion of Apel) as a principle of justice,
solidarity and co-responsibility of all for human development and welfare of
everyone. This principle, which is
related to the theme of fraternité,
could seem difficult to justify only from a liberal point of view according to
which the collective body should only guarantee security, whilst each
individual should autonomously provide his own welfare. However, this
separation (which reflects precise class interests) is in my view completely
arbitrary; the subjects who subscribe to the social contract, or to say it with
Marx, that generate an “association of free human beings”, do that not only for
the sake of security but also to live in the best way, to reach the common
welfare. Therefore the productive and economic sphere cannot be excluded from
the social contract (as required by Lockean liberalism) but is fully entitled
to be subsumed within it.
Now, if this is true, the
choice for a principle of co-responsibility can be defended in various ways. On
the one hand, one can reasonably argue that the principle of co-responsibility
of each one for the good of everyone follows from the principle of democracy
and develops it further. In order for citizens to be equally sovereign, they
should have access to equal possibilities for development and to realize their
own good. However, if one does not agree on such an extended interpretation of
democracy, the principle can be defended even a different way.
Let us start from the question
addressed by Rawls: assuming that the participants in the social contract are
rational individuals equally willing to pursue their own good, what principles
would they choose in order to distribute the benefits and costs of social
cooperation?
This question requires, in my
opinion, a very different answer from the one that Rawls provides when he
problematically assumes that the participants are rational individuals, neither
envious nor benevolent, and thus interested only in their own good and indifferent to that of others.
I think that one should argue
as follows (we can find a similar reflection in Axel Honneth's theory of
recognition): the participants of the social contract are individuals whose
personality is constituted through their taking part in social interaction. If
this is true, then actors who want to realize their own good understand that it
depends significantly on the good of others because: a) if other individuals do
not have the possibility to develop themselves and realize their own good, they
cannot produce the positive interactions capable of enriching all participants;
b) enjoying social goods to which others do not have access is an incomplete
and imperfect gratification, since it is often accompanied by a sense of guilt
and especially by a conflict that inevitably has a negative effect on human
relations when they are characterized by the fact that some have access to
certain social goods while others are deprived of them. From these reflections
it follows that the individual who wants his own good must also want the good of
those to whom he is related.
This perspective, inspired by
Marx (for whom the free development of everyone is a condition of the free
development of all) challenges the thesis shared by the modern acquisitive
imaginary according to which social goods are analogous to a sort of cake and
individuals live better if the piece they get is larger. For the reasons that I
mentioned above, I believe this thesis to be wrong. So I think also that the
good to be maximized cannot be identified, as in Rawls, with a list of primary
goods; rather, it should be framed in a Marxist-Aristotelian perspective, inspired by Amartya Sen and Martha
Nussbaum, which focuses on
self-realization of the individual and development of his human capabilities
and relations.
This choice also involves a
significant transformation of the Rawlsian account of modern liberalism: while
the latter affirms the priority of right over good (according to which society
grants to each an amount of primary goods that everyone uses to develop his own
good), the account I am trying to defend establishes a reciprocity between the
right and the good and holds that society should make human development its own
end. This account cannot avoid relying on a precise conception of man and good,
which may still need to be validated in the democratic dialogue. (A similar position can be found in the writings
of Amartya Sen, who actually is, from some liberal perspectives, charged with
paternalism).
This framework could be completed
with an analog of the Rawlsian difference principle: inequalities in the level
of self-realization and human development are legitimized only insofar as they
are able to increase the level of self-realization and development of the
capacities of less-advantaged people in the
society.
Perhaps we can define
“democracy” as a society that is inspired to the above-mentioned principles;
democracy is, as C. B. Macpherson puts it, “a kind of society, a whole complex
of relations between individuals rather than simply a system of government”.
This kind of democracy, Macpherson continues, is not limited to the principle
of “one man, one vote”, but completes it by claiming “one man, one equal
effective right to live as fully humanly as he may wish.”[3]
Posing these normative and abstract principles,
however, would be totally useless if one fails to consider the real structures
of society and the way in which such principles are effectively applied in the
real world. The normative dimension needs to be connected with the analytical
one: this is the claim correctly made by Jacques Bidet, and rather neglected in
the perspectives of Rawls and Habermas.
Basically, I think that we
cannot avoid the following question: how do we have to think the relationship
between these very general normative principles and real social structures? Is
it not necessary to theoretically articulate this relationship instead of
considering it a kind of unimportant appendix? The concept, couched in
different terms, is: normative theories are concerned with a possible
modernity, whereas the relationship between possible modernity and real
modernity, theoretical models and real social structures, remains totally
obscure.
Rawls and Habermas give no
clear answer to this question. Nevertheless, we can retrieve from their texts
some hints at the ways in which they evaluate the degree of implementation in
the real society of their normative principles. With regard to this topic, two
thoughts are, in my opinion, meaningful. Rawls writes in A Theory of Justice:
Historically one of the main defects of constitutional
government has been the failure to ensure the fair value of political liberty.
The necessary corrective steps have not been taken, indeed, they never seem to
have been seriously entertained. Disparities in the distribution of property
and wealth that far exceed what is compatible with political equality have
generally been tolerated by the legal system…thus inequities in the economic
and social system may soon undermine whatever political equality might have
existed under fortunate historical conditions.[4]
The Rawlsian
principles of political justice are, thus, principles far from being realized.
Let us read what
Habermas writes in The Future of Human
Nature:
A
universalistic understanding of law and morality rests on the assumption that
there is no definite obstacle to egalitarian interpersonal relations. Of
course, our societies are marked by manifest as well as structural violence.
They are impregnated by the micropower of silent repression, disfigured by
despotic suppression, deprivation of political rights, social disempowerment,
and economic exploitation. However, we could not scandalized by this if we did
not know that these shameful conditions might also be different.[5]
From these two thoughts I think that we can derive the
idea that both Habermas and Rawls consider the current societies, consistently
with their normative principles, as characterized, in some respects, by
injustice and exploitation. But they do not explain why, at least partly,
society is not congruent with normative principles. They do not examine a theme
which I regard as fundamental, namely how we can think a historical-social
reality which, on the one hand, incorporates (as their objective spirit) some
normative principles and, on the other
hand, fails to meet them.
Therefore, the normative theory
must somehow connect itself with a more concrete theory of modernity. From this point of view, I think
that we might improve our theoretical framework if we integrate some Habermasian
theses with the perspective Jacques Bidet developed in many and important works.[6] In his perspective, capitalistic modernity is
characterized by a paradoxical and, somehow, contradictory nature: his
assumption is that the pretension to equality, freedom and rationality,
asserted in the Declarations of Rights (namely in terms of what Bidet names
“meta-structure”), “emerges in a social order in which it is undermined and
reversed in its opposite: inequality, exploitation and domination”.
Thus, we come to the crux of
the matter: a critical-normative theory should tackle, unlike Habermas and
Rawls, the question of how the principles of freedom, equality and rationality
reverse themselves in patterns of domination. How do we have to consider the
contradiction between these two levels?
A consistent critical theory,
in my opinion, should criticize modernity by articulating the paradoxical
relationship between the normative assumption of modernity, asserted in the
Declaration, and the structures of domination which shape it. To clarify this
problem, it is necessary to understand first of all, that the modern principle,
which establishes that all men have equal rights, is not implemented in an
ideal situation, as contractualism claims, but in a society already marked by
class divisions and power relationships. Prima
facie, we can focus on two problematical aspects, which regard the
interpretation of the modern principle of equality of rights and its range of
application.
As for interpretation, the
decisive point is that this principle is implemented in a specific manner,
characterized by: a) the primacy of individual autonomy (and of private property)
as opposed to public autonomy and social solidarity, and b) the close link
between individual freedom, the market and entrepreneurship freedom. So
interpreted, the principle implies that all men are equally free to operate in
the market, although their assets are unequal. The modern principle of equality
reverses itself in domination/subordination, because freedom and equality are
interpreted, in a liberal-Lockean sense, as guarantee of property and free
disposition over it. In this way, the pre-existent class division is
incorporated within the new framework of modernity and reproduced through the
forms of capitalistic economic organization.
To sum up, one might say that
the modern principle of equality of rights, because of the cultural and social
structure within which it is incorporated, is selectively implemented: the
right to self-realization and human development is subordinated to the right of
private property and of the market. Private freedom has primacy over public
freedom and the acknowledgement of democratic rights is cautious (at the
beginning overcautious), since the democratic rights are considered suspicious
and kept, as far as their range of application, within narrow limits.
As for the range of application, the problem is that the modern principle of equality of rights, what
Etienne Balibar names egaliberté, is
enforced only by a state apparatus and is only applied to those who are
citizens of a state or member of a demos;
and, inside the limits of the State, only to those recognized under the title
of ‘human being’ (this is the reason why this principle has been compatible
with racism, which violates the rights of those whom it denies the title of
‘human being’, and with sexism). The principle of equality of rights, tied to
the Nation despite Kant’s cosmopolitan claims, has never been applied on a
global (or interstate) level, where raw power and domination prevail. This,
through colonialism and imperialism, slowly opens up a civilization process, in
virtue of which only now we can catch a glimpse of the possibility of a global
social contract. However, this is still devoid of any enforcement mechanism.
So, in my view the task of a
critical theory for present times is to develop a theory of democracy which is
fully aware of the limits of existing liberal democracies and of systematic
forms of domination which limit equal freedom in modern societies. Hence, a
real democracy has to be qualified, first of all, as an inversion of dominant
contemporary priorities and as a deconstruction of unjustified inequalities,
both from the perspective of power relations and from that of welfare opportunities.
Inverting priorities means first of all emphasizing the primacy of social
solidarity over competition according to the principle of: solidarity – the
maximum possible; competition – the minimum necessary. Competition is a means
to create wealth, while solidarity is an end that society should consciously
pursue. Secondly, inverting priorities means to accept the primacy of those
goods which are essential for human development: living in a non-polluted
environment, having appropriate housing, health care, culture, social
relations, spheres of self-realization in the working place and out of it—all
this is more important than increasing the amount of goods available for
consumption.
Moreover, the deconstruction of
unjustified inequalities, which has always been an issue for democratic
struggles, involves not only inequalities of wealth and income but also those
of power. A democratic society is not only the one that promotes policies of
wealth redistribution and fighting inequality. It is also a society that limits
to the minimum necessary level, the subordination of workers to private
enterprises and to public organizations, and that supports the expansion of
democratic control even in these places.
Finally, a democratic society
is one that acts in order to bring politics closer to the interested people—to
the citizens by expanding the occasions for direct participation instead of
representative occasions, by privileging active participation on small scale
instead of delegation, and by denying every superfluous privilege that is not
necessary to the exercise of a specific role.
The incessant labour of
democracy represents, in my opinion, the still actual and vital part of the
heritage of critical theory.
an international and interdisciplinary journal of postmodern cultural sound, text and image
Volume 6, May-June 2009, ISSN
1552-5112
Notes